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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Marvin I. Barish, counsel for the plaintiff Mario Comuso, 
seeks immediate appellate review of the District Court's 
order dated April 25, 2000 imposing sanctions against him. 
We must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and, if not, whether we 
should issue a writ of mandamus as requested. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Comuso filed an action against the National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak") under the Federal Employer's 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. S 51 et seq., alleging that he 
suffered personal injuries while working for Amtrak. The 
trial commenced on January 11, 1999 before Judge Herbert 
J. Hutton in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Comuso was represented 
by Barish, and Amtrak was represented by Paul F.X. 
Gallagher. 
 
According to Barish, the trial began poorly for Gallagher, 
as testimony from the plaintiff 's witnesses showed that 
certain representations that Gallagher had made during his 
opening statement were false. Gallagher responded by 
cross-examining the plaintiff with a line of questioning that 
Barish believed was improper and which angered him. After 
the cross-examination, the court called a recess. 
 
It is the events that took place during that recess on 
January 12, 1999 that ultimately led to the sanctions 
against Barish. These facts are not really disputed by the 
parties. Outside the presence of the District Judge or the 
jury, but apparently in the presence of several witnesses, 
Barish approached Gallagher with his fists cocked and 
threatened to kill him. Barish was screaming when he 
threatened Gallagher. Barish called Gallagher a"fat pig", a 
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"mother f-----," and "lower than whale s----." App. at 456- 
459. These threats culminated with Barish's assistant, 
Randy Zevin, having to physically pull Barish away from 
Gallagher. According to Barish's own testimony at the 
hearing he stated that he said "if you come around me, I'm 
going to kill you," J.A. at 454, which in his brief before this 
court he explains as meant to be "a warning to Mr. 
Gallagher (albeit in an admittedly heated and hyperbolic 
fashion) to stay away from him in the future." Br. of 
Appellant at 15 n.10. 
 
After the recess, the court summoned a United States 
Marshal and declared a mistrial. The court stated,"The 
constant bickering and lack of gentlemanly conduct in the 
courtroom in front of the jury was of such a nature that I've 
never seen it before." App. at 257-258. Barish objected, but 
the court noted that Barish threatened Gallagher's life in 
the presence of witnesses. Barish denied that he threatened 
Gallagher's life. The court, however, declared that the 
matter was over and asked both counsel to leave the 
courtroom. 
 
Amtrak, after obtaining new counsel, moved for sanctions 
against Barish. The District Court held a hearing on March 
2, 2000 at which both Barish and Gallagher testified. 
Barish stated that his conduct "was not appropriate. I 
shouldn't have done it. I should have been able to control 
myself. . . . it's never going to happen again, I can tell you 
that." App. at 449. In addition, he admitted that"I think 
most of the things he said that I said, I did." App. at 454. 
However, Barish said that he would not have really killed or 
attacked Gallagher, as they were friends. Gallagher testified 
that Barish did threaten to kill him and that even though 
"as big as I am, I shouldn't have been that fearful of being 
stricken, . . . I felt I was going to take a hit." App. at 489. 
 
In an April 26, 2001 order, the District Court found, inter 
alia, that: 
 
       (1) Barish's outrageous profane behavior during the 
       Court's recess on January 12, 1999 was in bad 
       faith. 
 
       (2) Barish's conduct resulted in the needless waste of 
       judicial resources. 
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       (3) Barish imposed upon his client and his adversary 
       emotional and financial costs. 
 
       (4) Barish needlessly squandered the time and service 
       of the empaneled jury. 
 
       (5) Barish inexcusably delayed for both parties a 
       determination of their rights and status under the 
       law. 
 
       (6) Barish's prevarication impugned the integrity and 
       dignity of the proceedings and required the 
       intervention of the U.S. Marshal's Service to escort 
       him from the courtroom. 
 
Comuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 97-7891, slip op. 
at 5 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 25, 2000). 
 
The court considered its authority to impose sanctions 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1927, but held that S 1927 only applied 
to abuses of the judicial process, i.e., conduct while in 
court. However, the court noted that it had inherent powers 
to discipline attorneys practicing before it, citing to our 
decision in Matter of Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 
1975). After noting that Barish had engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct before other trial courts,1  the District Court 
ordered Barish to pay Amtrak reasonable fees and costs in 
litigating the Comuso matter. The court also disqualified 
Barish from the continued representation of Comuso. 
Finally, the court referred the opinion and record to the 
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
for review and consideration. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The court cited, inter alia, Spruill v. National RR Passenger Corp., 
1995 
WL 534273 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 5, 1995) (vacating plaintiff 's verdict and 
stating that Barish's conduct was "intemperate, inappropriate, and 
disrespectful" and "shocked the conscience of the court"); McEnrue v. 
New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. 90-4728 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 
1993) (vacating multi-million dollar verdict because of Barish's conduct); 
Patchell v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 1992 WL 799399 (E.D.Pa. 
July 31, 1992) (ordering new trial because of Barish's outrageous trial 
conduct); Bezerra v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 97-1511 
(Phila. County Ct. Common Pleas June 7, 1999) (referring to obscene 
and intemperate language by Barish); Muni v. National Railroad 
Passenger Corp., No. 97-1489, (Phila. County Ct. Common Pleas Jan. 21, 
1999) (trial court admonished Barish for making improper remarks). 
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After Barish filed a timely appeal to this court, Amtrak 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction. Subsequently, the District Court determined 
that Barish should pay $13,285.61 in reasonable fees and 
costs to Amtrak. Comuso v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 
97-7891, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Pa. filed Nov. 22, 2000). The 
court also placed the underlying case on its civil suspense 
file pending resolution of Barish's appeal. App. at 510. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Barish argues that the motion for sanctions was untimely 
as a matter of law and filed for a plainly improper purpose; 
sanctions could not be imposed under the court's inherent 
authority as a matter of law even assuming there was a 
legal basis for the court to use its inherent power; it 
committed reversible error by failing to conduct the 
analyses as required by the controlling law; the findings of 
law and fact that the District Court made are legally 
erroneous and are clearly insufficient to warrant the 
sanctions imposed; the District Court violated rules of law 
and ethics in its referral to the Disciplinary Board; and the 
District Court imposed sanctions in violation of Barish's 
due process rights. Amtrak responds that this court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal, the sanctions motion was not 
filed for an improper purpose, the sanctions motion was 
timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
ordering the sanctions, the manner of the District Court's 
referral to the Disciplinary Board was not improper, and 
Barish was afforded due process. 
 
In the view that we take of this case, we will not consider 
any of the contentions as to the merits of the sanctions 
order because we focus on our jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, "[t]he courts of appeals . . . 
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of 
the district courts of the United States." This rule requires 
parties to "raise all claims of error in a single appeal 
following final judgment on the merits." Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that a narrow class of 
prejudgment orders may be immediately appealable. Such 
"collateral orders" must (1) "conclusively determine the 
disputed question"; (2) "resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action"; and (3) 
"be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 
468 (1978). These requirements must be stringently applied 
in order to prevent the exception from swallowing the 
general rule. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). 
 
In the case at hand, the District Court has not yet 
entered a final judgment on the merits.2  Therefore, we must 
consider whether the District Court's sanctions order meets 
the three prongs of the collateral order doctrine. Amtrak 
concedes that the order is conclusive as to Barish's 
disqualification from the case and the referral of Barish's 
behavior to the Disciplinary Board. 
 
Furthermore, the court has since quantified the amount 
of costs and fees, and determined that Barish should pay 
$13,285.61 to Amtrak. Thus, the order satisfies the first 
prong of the collateral order doctrine. See Lazorko v. Pa. 
Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) ("An award of 
sanctions is not a final order, and thus not appealable, 
until the district court determines the amount of the 
sanction"). 
 
We turn next to consider whether the District Court's 
order meets the second and third prongs of the 
collateral order doctrine, importance/separateness and 
unreviewability. The second prong has been described as a 
two-part inquiry. See, e.g., Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 
1261 (3d Cir. 1995). We must ask whether "review now is 
less likely to force the appellate court to consider 
approximately the same (or a very similar) matter more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It appears that Barish's appeal of the sanctions order, which includes 
Barish's disqualification to represent Comuso, is one of the factors that 
has held up resumption of the trial proceedings. We note that the court's 
order did not disqualify other lawyers in Barish's firm, and Amtrak's 
brief states that another lawyer has entered an appearance for Comuso 
in the District Court. 
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than once, and also seems less likely to delay trial court 
proceedings (for, if the matter is truly collateral, those 
proceedings might continue while the appeal is pending)." 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995). We must also 
consider "the value of interests that would be lost through 
rigorous application of a final judgment requirement." 
Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 878-79.3  Regarding the third 
prong, the "order must be such that review postponed will 
be review denied." Martin, 63 F.3d at 1261 (quotation 
omitted). 
 
The appealability of a district court's order disqualifying 
the plaintiff 's attorneys from a civil case was at issue in 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985). In 
that case, the trial court disqualified counsel and their law 
firm and revoked their pro hac vice admissions for releasing 
certain information to the media and improper contacts 
with a witness. The Court of Appeals reversed after holding 
that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and reversed. 
 
The Court noted that it had previously held that an order 
denying a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case was 
not subject to immediate appeal but it had left open the 
issue of the appealability of an order granting 
disqualification. Id. at 431-32 (citing Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)). The Court 
then noted that thereafter it held that "a district court's 
pretrial order granting disqualification of defense counsel in 
a criminal case was not immediately appealable." Id. at 432 
(citing Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984)). The 
Court then decided that the same was true for a 
disqualification order in a civil case. Regarding the second 
of the prong, the Court stated that a disqualification order, 
"though `final,' is not independent of the issues to be tried." 
Id. at 439. The Court noted that "[o]nly after assessing the 
effect of the ruling on the final judgment could an appellate 
court decide whether the client's rights had been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The "importance" requirement has been alternatively considered in 
connection with the third prong of the collateral order doctrine. See 
Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 878. 
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prejudiced. If respondent were to proceed to trial and there 
receive as effective or better assistance from substitute 
counsel than the disqualified attorney could provide, any 
subsequent appeal of the disqualification ruling would fail." 
Id. at 439. 
 
Significantly, the Court rejected a case-by-case approach 
to determining whether a particular ruling would be 
immediately appealable. It recognized that "[e]ven if some 
orders disqualifying counsel are separable from the merits 
of the litigation, many are not." Id. at 439. Therefore, it 
concluded that "orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, 
as a class, are not sufficiently separable from the merits to 
qualify for interlocutory appeal." Id. at 440 (emphasis 
added). 
 
The Court further held that a "disqualification order can 
be reviewed as effectively on appeal of a final judgment as 
on an interlocutory appeal." Id. at 438. In so holding, the 
Court expressly rejected the argument that "the disqualified 
attorney's personal desire for vindication [is] . . . an 
independent ground from interlocutory appeal." Id. at 434- 
35. The Court recognized that a disqualified attorney "may 
well have a personal interest in pursuing an immediate 
appeal, an interest which need not coincide with the 
interests of the client." Id. at 435."As a matter of 
professional ethics, however, the decision to appeal should 
turn entirely on the client's interest." Id.  (citing Model Rules 
of Prof 'l Conduct R. 1.7(b), 2.1 (1985)). 
 
Amtrak argues that Richardson-Merrell is dispositive here. 
Barish seeks to distinguish Richardson-Merrell  on the 
ground that Richardson-Merrell considered only the 
disqualification of an attorney and did not consider the 
appealability of other sanctions, such as the imposition of 
reasonable fees and costs. He contends that his case is 
more analogous to two decisions from this court which 
upheld jurisdiction even after Richardson-Merrell. 
 
In Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman , 775 
F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1985), we considered the appealability of 
a sanctions order imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against 
the plaintiff 's attorney for the amount of $1,642.50 in 
reasonable fees and costs. The attorney immediately 
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withdrew from the case and the plaintiff obtained new 
counsel and proceeded with the litigation. The sanctioned 
attorney appealed the Rule 11 sanctions order. We first 
recognized that the first two prongs of the collateral order 
doctrine were satisfied because the order "finally and 
conclusively determines the sanctions issue, and the 
resolution thereof is completely separate from the merits of 
the case." Eavenson, 775 F.2d. at 538. 
 
We also then concluded that the order was effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment, reasoning that 
because the sanctioned attorney was "no longer connected 
with the merits of the case, he has an immediate interest in 
challenging the sanction which is not shared by the parties 
to the suit or by counsel to a party." Id.  at 538-39. 
Moreover, "the possibility exists that appellant's former 
client may ultimately prevail on the merits, or settle the 
case; in either of those situations, it is not clear that 
appellant would be able to appeal from final judgment." Id. 
at 539. In addition, "it is quite possible, even likely, that 
appellant, as a non-party, may be unaware that the suit 
has been terminated so as to be able to file a timely appeal. 
Thus, appellant might never be able to receive any appellate 
review of the sanctions order if he is denied that 
opportunity now." Id. We therefore concluded that the 
sanctions order was an immediately appealable collateral 
order. 
 
The second case relied on by Barish, In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1997), involved 
what we described as "heavy sanctions" against a law firm 
and a corporate client for discovery abuses: a fine of 
$250,000 and $750,000 respectively and the suspension of 
two attorneys from practicing law in the district court for 
three years and a third attorney for a year. Id.  at 371-72. 
Citing to Eavenson, we ruled that the sanctions order was 
immediately appealable by the attorneys. In re Tutu Wells, 
120 F.3d at 378. Regarding the separateness prong, we 
recognized that "our review of the order suspending [the 
attorneys] would not force us to examine the merits of the 
case at all." Id. We then noted that the suspended attorneys 
were no longer in the underlying litigation and therefore 
could not effectively appeal the sanctions. Lastly, we stated 
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that the suspension from legal practice "impose[s] 
significant burdens on the reputation and career 
opportunities of the sanctioned attorney." Id. at 379 
(quotation omitted). Therefore, we held that we had 
jurisdiction over the appeal of that order. 
 
Barish seeks to analogize his appeal to those in Eavenson 
and In re Tutu Wells because he is no longer part of the 
litigation and will have difficulty in appealing the decision. 
Barish's analogy fails for several reasons. First, neither of 
those cases involved a disqualification of an attorney from 
the case. The sanction in Eavenson was merely an award of 
attorney's fees and costs, and the attorney withdrew after 
the imposition of the sanctions. In re Tutu Wells involved a 
suspension from practicing law, which is a far more severe 
penalty than mere disqualification from a case. The 
principal concern when an attorney is disqualified from a 
case is with the party's ability to choose his/her lawyer and 
to proceed with the litigation, whereas the suspension of an 
attorney from practicing law implicates the attorney's ability 
to pursue other career opportunities. 
 
Barish argues that the District Court's order has imposed 
burdens on his reputation and career opportunities, and 
notes that a district court in New Jersey recently rejected 
Barish's pro hac vice application, based in part on the 
sanctions order in Comuso.4 Even if the force of our 
reasoning in In re Tutu Wells remained unqualified, it would 
not require our acceptance of jurisdiction here as the 
disqualification of Barish from one case and the denial of 
his pro hac vice application is not of the same magnitude as 
a suspension of the practice of law for several years. 
 
Of more direct significance is the Supreme Court's 
decision in Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio , 527 U.S. 
198 (1999), which was issued after our decisions in 
Eavenson and In re Tutu Wells. In Cunningham, after 
holding that the plaintiff 's attorney engaged in a pattern of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that a panel of this court recently dismissed for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction Barish's appeal from that order denying his pro hac 
vice application. See Kohlmayer v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 
Nos. 01-1202 & 01-1508, Order Dismissing Appeal for Lack of 
Jurisdiction, July 16, 2001. 
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discovery abuses, the district court disqualified that 
attorney from the case and ordered her to pay $1,494 in 
reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). 
The attorney then appealed. The court of appeals dismissed 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
 
The Court stated that "[w]e do not think . . . that 
appellate review of a sanctions order can remain completely 
separate from the merits." Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 205. In 
particular, "[a]n evaluation of the appropriateness of 
sanctions may require the reviewing court to inquire into 
the importance of the information sought [in discovery] or 
the adequacy or truthfulness of a response." Id. The Court 
further determined that the sanctions order could be 
effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. The 
Court noted, as it did in Richardson-Merrell, that an 
attorney might have a personal interest in pursuing an 
immediate appeal of sanctions but that " `the decision to 
appeal should turn entirely on the client's interest.' " Id. at 
207 (quoting Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 435). 
 
The Court added: "[W]e do not think that the 
appealability of a Rule 37 sanction imposed on an attorney 
should turn on the attorney's continued participation [in 
the litigation]. Such a rule could not be easily administered 
. . . [and] could be subject to abuse if attorneys and clients 
strategically terminated their representation in order to 
trigger a right to appeal with a view to delaying the 
proceedings in the underlying case." Id. at 209. The Court 
expressly recognized that while "our application of the final 
judgment rule in this setting may require nonparticipating 
attorneys to monitor the progress of the litigation after their 
work has ended, the efficiency interests served by limiting 
immediate appeals far outweigh any nominal monitoring 
costs borne by attorneys." Id. Lastly, the Court noted that 
while declining jurisdiction would impose some hardships 
on an attorney, it was for Congress and not the courts to 
amend 28 U.S.C. S 1291 to allow for immediate appeal of 
certain orders. Id. at 210. 
 
Although the Cunningham decision did not refer to 
Eavenson and In re Tutu Wells, it chose not to follow the 
rationale of those cases. The fact that a trial court's order 
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disqualifies an attorney from a case (meaning that the 
attorney is no longer part of the litigation) does not make 
that order immediately appealable. Rather, that attorney 
must monitor the litigation and wait to appeal the 
sanctions order after there has been a final judgment on 
the merits. Therefore, our decisions in Eavenson  and In re 
Tutu Wells are no longer good law to the extent that they 
conflict with Cunningham. 
 
Barish attempts to distinguish Cunningham by noting 
that the Court's decision in that case specifically considered 
a sanctions order imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 for 
discovery abuses whereas in this case the District Court 
imposed sanctions under its inherent powers for conduct 
that occurred outside the court. The distinction is not 
dispositive. First, Barish's brief on the merits of his appeal 
seeks to defend or at least explain his actions by reviewing 
the trial tactics and strategy employed by both Gallagher 
and himself. See Br. of Appellant at 10-16. Any 
consideration of the sanctions imposed against him would 
necessitate consideration of the merits of the litigation. But 
more important is that the Supreme Court has consistently 
rejected a case-by-case approach in deciding whether an 
order was separate from the merits of the litigation in favor 
of a per se rule that sanctions orders are inextricably 
intertwined with the merits of the case. See Cunningham, 
527 U.S. at 206; Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 439. 
Therefore, we hold that the District Court's order imposing 
sanctions against Barish is not sufficiently separate from 
the underlying merits of the case. 
 
Moreover, we note that denying jurisdiction now does not 
prevent appellate review of the sanctions in an appeal of the 
final judgment on the merits. The fact that Barish is no 
longer part of the litigation does not make the sanctions 
order immediately appealable. We recognize that Barish has 
a personal interest at stake that may be different from his 
client's interests. But, as the Supreme Court noted in 
Richardson-Merrell and Cunningham, the interests of the 
client must come first. Comuso obviously has an interest in 
a speedy resolution of his claims, but Barish's appeal has 
already delayed the action from proceeding to a new trial. 
App. at 510. That Barish may have to monitor the progress 
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of the litigation in order to appeal upon final judgment is 
not dispositive. See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 209. 
Therefore, the order imposing sanctions on Marvin Barish 
is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
Barish alternatively argues that we should issue a writ of 
mandamus to the District Court. A writ of mandamus 
should be issued only in extraordinary circumstances, 
where there has been a clear abuse of discretion or conduct 
amounting to the usurpation of judicial power. See Mallard 
v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989). 
Petitioners for the writ must also show "that they lack 
adequate alternative means to obtain the relief they seek" 
and that their right to issuance of the writ is"clear and 
indisputable." Id. In light of Barish's outrageous conduct, 
and the Supreme Court's affirmation of a district court's 
inherent power to discipline attorneys appearing before it, 
see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991), we 
cannot hold that the District Court's sanction in this case 
exceeded the boundaries of appropriate judicial response 
warranting issuance of a writ of mandamus. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction and deny the petition for a writ of 
mandamus. 
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